Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet by Rowe, Elizabeth A.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2007
Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the
Internet
Elizabeth A. Rowe
University of Florida Levin College of Law, rowe@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Computer Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual
Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 1041 (2007), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/63
INTRODUCING A TAKEDOWN FOR
TRADE SECRETS ON THE INTERNET
ELIZABETH A. ROWE*
I. Introduction .......................................................... 1042
II. Background: Trade Secrets on the Internet ..................... 1046
III. A Takedown for Trade Secrets Merits Consideration ......... 1049
IV. Section 512 of the DMCA ........................................ 1052
A. The Formation of the DMCA ............................... 1052
B. Details of the DMCA Safe-Harbor Provision ............. 1056
C. Section 512 Protection in a Nutshell ....................... 1058
D. Summary of DMCA Criticisms ............................. 1060
V. Anatomy of the Legislation ....................................... 1061
A . Safe H arbor .................................................... 1062
B. Dealing with Frivolous Requests ........................... 1063
C. Carveout for Mere Conduits ................................. 1065
D. Carveout for the Press ........................................ 1065
E. Subpoena Provision ........................................... 1066
F. Counternotice Not Required ................................. 1067
G. Strict Compliance Required ................................. 1069
H. Prospective Application ...................................... 1070
VI. Other Potential Concerns .......................................... 1071
A. First Amendment Objections ................................ 1071
1. The Statute Operates as a Prior Restraint on
Speech ...................................................... 1074
a. Internet Posters Analogous to Traditional
M edia? ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
b. Adequate Safeguards ................................ 1076
c. Lesser Protection for Commercial Speech ....... 1077
2. The Statute Acts as a Punishment for Lawfully
Obtained Truthful Information About a Matter of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
I am very grateful to Scott Baker, Alfred Brophy, Christine Farley, Christine Klein,
Lyrissa Lidsky, John Nagle, Bill Page, and Sharon Rush for comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. I also thank, for their comments, participants at the Jurisgenesis 2007
conference, hosted by Washington University and St. Louis University Schools of Law,
the SEALS New Scholars Workshop, and the 2007 Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference, hosted by DePaul University College of Law. Finally, for research
assistance I gratefully acknowledge Allison Imber, who worked diligently from the
inception of this project, as well as Todd Rich and Gary Sobolevskiy, who subsequently
joined the team.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Public Significance ....................................... 1078
a. Unlawfully Obtained ................................. 1079
b. Public Significance ................................... 1080
c. An Observation on the Public-Versus-Private-
Concern Labels ....................................... 1081
d. Trade Secrets as Quasi-Property ................... 1083
B. Trade-Secret-Identification Issues .......................... 1085
C. Technological Puzzles ........................................ 1085
D . International M aterials ........................................ 1088
V II. C onclusion ........................................................... 1089
I. INTRODUCTION
Late on a Friday afternoon in October, Wal-Mart executives
discover that the content of their sales circulars for the entire Christmas
season has just been posted on fatwallet.com, a bargain-shoppers
discussion forum. The posted content includes Wal-Mart's closely
guarded sale prices. Fearing that competitors may use the valuable
pricing information to compete unfairly, Wal-Mart's attorneys
immediately contact the operators of the Web site to request that they
remove Wal-Mart's trade-secret information. The operators refuse.
They contend, correctly, that since the information is not copyrighted,
they have no obligation to remove it under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), which does not cover trade secrets. The
information remains posted throughout the weekend and for another
four days until Wal-Mart obtains a temporary restraining order from
the court to have the material removed. By then, however, overjoyed
shoppers have distributed the circulars all over the Internet, and, using
this information, Wal-Mart's competitors are modifying their planned
promotions.'
This Article explores, for the first time, an existing void in trade-
secret law. When a trade-secret owner discovers that its trade secrets
have been posted on the Internet, there is currently no legislative
mechanism by which the owner can request that the information be
taken down. The only remedy to effectuate removal of the material is to
obtain a court order, usually either a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction.2 When a trade secret appears on the Internet,
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on a real event. Eddan Katz, Bargain
Shoppers Chilled by Retailers' DMCA Threats, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherlD=280.
2. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 7-8
(Cal. 2003) (requiring plaintiff to file suit against Web-site operators after they ignored
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the owner often loses the ability to continue to claim it as a trade secret
and to prevent others from using it.3 Accordingly, trade-secret owners
bear the burden of being vigilant and acting quickly if there is to be any
chance of preserving the trade-secret status of the information. The
current requirement of a court order for a takedown not only is costly
but also is too slow for trade-secret owners because of the speed with
which users distribute information over the Internet. Obtaining a
temporary order from a court would likely take no fewer than several
days.4
Given that secrecy is vital to preserving trade-secret status, time is
of the essence to trade-secret owners, and each hour that a trade secret
is available on the Internet is an hour too long. In order to address this
time-lapse problem, this Article explores a proposal for trade-secret
takedown legislation similar to that which provides for the immediate
removal of suspected copyright violations under the DMCA. A
takedown provision for trade secrets would provide self-regulation and
privatized enforcement in an effort to permit trade-secret owners to
save their trade secrets from near-certain death on the Internet. A
takedown provision would offer an expedited process for disabling
access to trade-secret information in the interim period between
discovery of the misappropriated material and issuance of a ruling by a
court.
The threat of trade secrets appearing on the Internet occurs with
sufficient frequency5 and potentially poses grave threats to trade-secret
the plaintiffs request to remove the plaintiffs allegedly trade-secret information from
their Web sites). Another procedural approach might be to file an in rem action seeking
removal of the posting. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet:
Preventing the Internet from Being an Instrument of Destruction, in 12TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 403, 412 (PLI Intellectual Property,
Course Handbook Series No. G-877, 2006).
3. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet
Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 46 (2007) (explaining
that, generally, when a trade secret appears on the Internet and becomes public, the
owner loses the ability to claim it as a trade secret and prevent others from using it).
4. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief in trade-secret cases face a delicate
struggle between moving quickly to stem further dissemination of the secret and
proceeding with deliberation after careful investigation of the facts and preparation of
the pleadings. Otherwise, plaintiffs not only may fail to obtain relief but also may
expose themselves to possible sanctions or counterclaims. See generally JAMES POOLEY,
TRADE SECRETS § 10.06[1l] (1997).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 2002)
(involving an employee who solicited potential buyers of his employer's trade secrets
over the Internet); United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (e-mailing
trade secrets outside the company without authorization); O'Grady v. Superior Court,
44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (seeking identity of sources who
disclosed Apple's trade secrets); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns
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owners and the functioning of the economy. Thus, the threat merits
action or at least an open discussion. The fact that no less than forty-
two amicus briefs supporting the trade-secret owner were filed in D VD
v. Bunner, a significant trade-secret-disclosure case, is but one salient
indication of this issue's importance to industry.6
Indeed, there might be an even larger number of reported trade-
secret-disclosure cases were it not for the nature of trade secrets and the
lack of a takedown mechanism. Unlike copyright law, which has
yielded many instances of reported and unreported cases involving
copyright infringement on the Internet,7 trade-secret law has not
provided adequate remedies. This might have caused trade-secret
owners who suffered from Internet postings to disguise their claims in
copyright clothing in order to request a takedown under the DMCA.'
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (involving the posting of
the Church of Scientology's secret documents); NewSouth Commc'ns Corp. v.
Universal Tel. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-2722, 2002 WL 31246558, at *1, *9 (E.D. La.
Oct. 4, 2002) (e-mailing trade secrets outside the company without authorization);
Edelman v. N2H2, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 137, 138 (D. Mass. 2003) (involving a
computer researcher seeking declaratory judgment allowing him to post potentially
trade-secret information on the Internet); Chrysler Corp. v. Sheridan, No. 227757,
2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 312, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2003) (mentioning
employee's disclosure of Chrysler's confidential information to others, including an
online publication); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich.
1999) (involving the posting of Ford's secret documents); United States v. Genovese,
409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving the posting of Microsoft source
code on the Internet); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (involving the posting of the Church of Scientology's secret documents);
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2003) (posting a secret
program regarding encryption of DVDs); Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773,
774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (seeking identity of individual who posted trade
secret on Internet).
6. See Mike McKee, "Friends" in High Places: In a Sign of What's at Stake,
California Justices Deluged with 42 Amicus Briefs in Trade Secrets Dispute, MIAMI
DAILY Bus. REv., Aug. 30, 2002, at A1O.
7. In the last three years approximately seventy reported decisions were
issued addressing copyright infringement and the DMCA. A search of the Westlaw
federal-court-cases database for "'DMCA D.M.C.A.' 'Digital Millennium Copyright
Act' & 'copyright infring!' & 'da(last 3 years)'" yielded sixty-nine cases. A similar
search conducted in the LexisNexis federal-court-cases database yielded seventy-eight
cases. The Chilling Effects database contained 1,248 takedown notices related to the
DMCA safe harbor provisions. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://
www.chillingeffects.org/graph.cgi (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
8. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. Indeed, attempting to use the
DMCA takedown to address trade-secret harm may have led to liability for
misrepresentation. See, e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d
1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding defendant liable under 17 U.S.C. § 512(0 for
misrepresenting potentially trade-secret-protectable information as entitled to copyright
protection). Because the takedown provision under the DMCA applies exclusively to
copyright law, it may have had the unintended consequence of an overreporting of
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Moreover, because the value of a trade secret lies in its secrecy, most
misappropriators who have acquired others' trade secrets and plan to
use them for their own competitive advantage have no incentive to
publicize the secrets. 9 Thus, historically, trade-secret-misappropriation
cases have only implicated disclosure of the secrets in a very limited
fashion, such as to a new employer.
The Internet's rise, however, has spawned a motivation to acquire
trade secrets for a reason other than competitive advantage-employee
revenge. The ease with which virtually anyone can post information on
the Internet, coupled with the Internet's "disinhibiting effect""0 and a
general decline in employee loyalty," has allowed disgruntled
employees to achieve the ultimate revenge against their former
employers by destroying trade secrets. One court noted the shift in the
balance of power made possible by the Internet: "With the Internet,
significant leverage is gained by the gadfly, who has no editor looking
over his shoulder and no professional ethics to constrain him.
Technology blurs the traditional identities of David and Goliath."12
Accordingly, Internet disclosures are likely to become a greater
problem than they have been in the past. Trade-secret owners also
instances of alleged copyright infringement and a corresponding underreporting of
suspected trade-secret-misappropriation cases on the Internet. Thus, trade-secret law
has not benefited from the rise in reported cases under the DMCA. Interestingly, a by-
product of enacting trade-secret-takedown legislation might be that it alleviates some of
the misuse of the DMCA's takedown notices whereby claimants disguise what really
are trade-secret claims as copyright infringement in order to make use of § 512. See
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 678, 684 (2006) (discussing use of § 512 notices
for unfair competition and privacy claims and the extent to which the notices appeared
to be used against competitors).
9. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d
185, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that a defendant in a trade-secret case typically
"has as much interest as the plaintiff has in keeping the secret away from good faith
competitors and out of the public domain").
10. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007) (discussing the
phenomenon whereby users of the Internet are less inhibited when expressing
themselves).
11. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 519, 552 (2001) (discussing the old psychological contract, which required the
employee to give loyalty to the employer in exchange for job security and indicating
that it has been replaced with lower expectations from both the employee and the
employer); Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the
United States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 339 (1999) (examining various
components of employee loyalty).
12. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
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hesitate to file suits because they fear that such lawsuits will incite even
greater discussion or even disclosure of their trade secrets online. One
trade-secret owner resorted to filing suit as an anonymous plaintiff in
order to avoid further economic harm from the publicity, but the court
ultimately prohibited the owner from proceeding anonymously. 3
Despite the apparent necessity for this kind of legislative
mechanism, Congress should tread cautiously to maintain an
appropriate balance between protection for trade-secret owners, on the
one hand, and the public's right to free expression and the use of
information in the public domain, on the other hand. Ultimately, the
objective should be for policy makers to create legislation that a trade-
secret owner can use as a shield to protect its intellectual property
rather than as a sword to suppress publication of embarrassing
content. 14 It is also important that Congress tailor any legislation to fit
existing trade-secret-law principles in order to ensure consistency in
implementation and application by courts. The legislation proposed in
this Article keeps these objectives in mind.
Part II of this Article provides relevant background about the law
pertaining to trade secrets on the Internet. Part III explains why a
takedown provision for trade-secret law merits consideration. Part IV
summarizes the DMCA safe-harbor provision. Part V introduces
components of trade-secret-takedown legislation while Part VI
addresses potential areas of concern, such as the First Amendment and
technological challenges. Part VII concludes by arguing that in light of
the various considerations explored in the Article, Congress should
consider takedown legislation for trade secrets using the DMCA safe-
harbor provision as a starting point.
II. BACKGROUND: TRADE SECRETS ON THE INTERNET
Trade-secret law only protects secret information. 5 The Internet
makes information publicly available.16 Naturally, these opposing
13. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377,
385 (Va. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff had not carried its burden of showing special
circumstances to justify anonymity, the court granted the ISP's motion to quash).
14. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1205
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
15. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)
("Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot
be a trade secret."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974)
("The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or
of a general knowledge in the trade or business."). For a more detailed analysis of
trade secrets on the Internet, see Rowe, supra note 3, at 7-10.
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functions set the stage for conflict. Thus, many courts assume that a
trade secret posted on the Internet has become generally known and
consequently has lost its trade-secret status. 7 Even when a party
posting' 8 trade-secret information may not have intended to cause harm
to the trade-secret owner, the nature of the Internet is such that the
posting could still destroy the secret.' 9 Unlike other mass media, the
Internet has no editors who scrutinize submissions and decide what
materials to publish. Any person sitting at a computer can post
information on the Internet, and the posting can result in immediate and
irreparable harm. One judge described the problem:
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user...
can destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting
them over the Internet, especially given the fact that there is
little opportunity to screen postings before they are made.
Nonetheless, one of the Internet's virtues, that it gives even
the poorest individuals the power to publish to millions of
readers, can also be a detriment to the value of intellectual
property rights. The anonymous (or judgment proof)
16. See generally Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1131
(9th Cir. 2006) ("Internet publication is a form of 'aggregate communication' in that it
is intended for a broad, public audience, similar to print media.") (internal citation
omitted); Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (stating that trade secrets posted on the FDA's Web site are available to the
public); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating
that posting information to a Web site available to the public is distribution).
17. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., No.
C-95-20091 RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *39-41 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995). But
see DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 190 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (finding that the mere posting of information on the Internet does not
destroy a trade secret).
18. Posting "consists of directly placing material on or in a Web site, bulletin
board, discussion group, newsgroup, or similar Internet site or 'forum,' where it will
appear automatically and more or less immediately to be seen by anyone with access to
that forum." O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 91 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006). Posting, therefore, allows direct self-publication of information. A person may
also send information to a site, but the owners or moderators of the site of decide what
to post. See id. at 91 n.15.
19. See, e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc., 402 F.3d at 1254-55, 1258
(reversing the district court's dismissal by holding that the FDA could be liable for
misappropriation of trade secrets where it posted plaintiffs trade secrets on its Web site
for five months and remanding the case to the district court).
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defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets,
leaving no one to hold liable for the misappropriation.2"
To make matters worse, the trade-secret owner may never know
the identity of the person making the disclosure, and the person posting
the information may very well be far removed from the person who
originally misappropriated the secret.
Under very limited circumstances a trade-secret owner might be
able to save its trade secret from the near-certain death sentence
imposed by the Internet.2 Critical to this preservation model, however,
is how long the trade secret is exposed and how quickly its owner acts
to prevent further dissemination of the trade secret. The rate at which
information spreads across the Internet dictates that a trade-secret
owner's actions should be correspondingly rapid. Information that has
been posted for more than one or two days is much more likely to have
become "generally known," and deemed to have lost its status as a
trade secret, than information that has been posted for a shorter amount
of time.22
Accordingly, a trade-secret owner who discovers its trade-secret
information on the Internet must respond immediately and show that it
took prompt action to remove the information or stem its further
dissemination.23  In seeking to retain trade-secret protection of
information that has been posted, the goal is to separate trade-secret
owners who have "slept on their rights" upon discovering the
potentially fatal disclosure from those who have responded promptly.24
Unfortunately, given the special concerns associated with trade-secret
cases involving Internet postings, the tools currently in place for
addressing removals from Web sites are not satisfactory. If trade-secret
owners are to bear the burden of acting swiftly to remove trade secrets
from Web sites, then the legal system should provide appropriate,
efficient, and effective mechanisms for trade-secret owners to do so.
20. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
21. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 29-39 (discussing a preservation model for
analyzing when trade-secret protection may be retained despite disclosure).
22. Id. at 32-33.
23. The appropriate strategy must be carefully tailored in light of the
circumstances. See Cundiff, supra note 2, at 408-13 (discussing considerations in
litigating to remove trade secrets from the Internet).
24. Rowe, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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III. A TAKEDOWN FOR TRADE SECRETS MERITS CONSIDERATION
A trade secret can be any information of value that is used in a
business, has been kept secret, and provides an economic advantage
over competitors .2' The wide range of information entitled to trade-
secret protection includes costs, sales records, customer lists and
information, marketing strategies, secret contract terms, unpublished
pricing information, and chemical formulas.26 Trade secrets encompass
approximately eighty percent of the assets of some companies.27 In
addition, prior to obtaining patent protection, virtually all inventions are
covered by trade-secret protection.28
From an efficiency perspective, trade secrets deserve strong
protection because of their importance to industry and the economy.29
Trade secrets are integral to the economy because they protect and
encourage innovation.3 ° Publicly traded U.S. companies own an
estimated $5 trillion in trade-secret information. 3' Trade secrets are
important to businesses of all sizes, from the smallest mom-and-pop
shops to the largest multinational entities..32 Trade secrets are often the
most valuable intangible assets of a company,33 and the survival of a
company may depend on its ability to protect its trade secrets. In the
Internet age, securing information can be especially daunting because
25. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538
(2005); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
26. See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1265-70 (7th Cir. 1995);
ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 728-30 (Ark. 2000); McFarland
v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 13, 1998).
27. See John P. Hutchins, The Corporation's Valuable Assets: IP Rights
Under Sox, in 26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 289, 291 (PLI
Intellectual Property, Course Handbook Series No. G-859, 2006).
28. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155
(1989).
29. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment:
The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1037
(2000) ("[T]he full set of efficiency arguments opts strongly for the protection of trade
secrets, given their essential role in modem industry.").
30. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); Marina
Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1633, 1633-35 (1998) (noting that corporations are increasingly relying on trade-secret
protection).
31. See Hutchins, supra note 27, at 292.
32. See generally id.; ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 34-35 (4th ed.
2006) (discussing the importance of trade secrets to small companies).
33. R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine,
in TRADE SECRETS 2002: How TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS & TECHNICAL
INFORMATION 145, 151 (PLI Intellectual Property, Course Handbook Series No. G-719,
2006).
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once a trade secret has been disclosed, even if inadvertently, it ceases
to be a trade secret.34
Part of the appeal of choosing trade-secret protection over other
kinds of intellectual property protection is the broad scope of
protectable information and the relative ease with which a business can
claim such protection.35 A business can, for example, protect trade
secrets without complying with a governmental registration system.
36
Unlike copyright law, trade-secret law, by definition, protects only
economically valuable information.37 Copyright law covers "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. "38
Trade-secret law protects invention and information whereas copyright
law does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."39  Accordingly, the kind of proprietary information and
innovative concepts that drive the economy tend to fall outside the
copyright paradigm and into the ambit of trade-secret law.'
34. While the risk of loss is one that is inherent in choosing this form of
protection, it does not necessarily suggest that a trade-secret owner should have instead
chosen patent protection. The choice of trade-secret protection or patent protection must
be based on a very careful assessment of the particular information involved and
thorough consideration of business and legal factors involving, for example, the nature
of the information, the ease with which it can be reverse engineered, and the feasibility
and cost of obtaining patent protection. See generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The
Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal Business
Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371 (2002). Accordingly, an owner
that chooses trade-secret protection over patent protection has not necessarily forgone a
"better" form of protection, especially since there is a wide range of information that is
eligible for trade-secret protection but not patent protection. See POOLEY, supra note 4,
§ 3.01 [ 1] [a] (comparing patent protection and trade-secret protection).
35. Brooks W. Taylor, You Can't Say That!." Enjoining Publication of Trade
Secrets Despite the First Amendment, 9 COMP. L. REv. & TECH. J. 393, 394-95 (2005)
(discussing reasons why corporations rely on trade-secret protection).
36. Copyright protection may attach without registration, but registration is
necessary before a plaintiff files suit for infringement. Thus, prior to registration a
copyright owner is in a similar situation as the owner of a trade secret who does not
know whether the targeted material will indeed be protectable. Registration of a
copyright provides a presumption of validity. Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc.,
893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990).
37. Roger M. Milgrim, Commission Proposed Capital Punishment-By
Definition-for Trade Secrets, A Uniquely Valuable IP Right, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 919, 941 (2006) ("[U]nlike both patent and copyright law...
trade secret law offers protection solelyto matter of value .... .
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
39. Id. § 102(b).
40. Lao, supra note 30, at 1634.
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If, similar to copyrights, trade-secret information is of such
importance that it warrants special protection in the context of the
Internet, then the next inquiry must involve the manner in which such
protection is offered. To the extent that part of copyright law's impetus
for providing a safe-harbor takedown for Internet-service providers
(ISPs) is meant to address any potential liability for copyright
infringement, the same concerns also apply to trade-secret law.4 An
ISP may be liable for trade-secret misappropriation if the ISP knows or
has reason to know that a subscriber is misappropriating a trade
secret.42 Arguably, the notice from the trade-secret owner would be
sufficient to create the requisite level of knowledge. Accordingly, it
makes sense to consider a similar framework for both trade secrets and
copyrights because the underlying reasons for the legislation and the
ultimate objectives are comparable.
It is noteworthy that trade-secret law does not include anything
akin to copyright law's fair-use doctrine.43 Thus, the wide range of
possible defenses available to one who posts allegedly infringing
copyright material on the Internet is not available in the trade-secret
context. This suggests that trade-secret law more clearly defines
whether the use of material is inappropriate and that, consequently,
takedown notices for trade secrets will rarely lack a legitimate basis."
However, trade-secret law suffers from its own gray areas, including
the fluid nature of identifying trade secrets and the fact that, unlike
copyright law,45 trade-secret law must confront First Amendment
principles.46 Nevertheless, the damage from unauthorized copyright
infringement is likely to be less than the damage from the posting of a
trade secret.
41. Some commentators question whether ISPs should ever be liable for
copyright infringement. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? 5 (2005). This debate is beyond the
scope of this Article.
42. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii) (1985). The RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995) and RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
(1939) include definitions that are consistent with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
43. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property Some
Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Barmicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 717-18
(2003).
44. See infra notes 125 and 131 and accompanying text.
45. Copyright cases are generally not subject to First Amendment scrutiny
because copyright law already includes fair-use and other free-expression safeguards.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US. 186, 221 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
46. See infra Part VLA.
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IV. SECTION 512 OF THE DMCA
A. The Formation of the DMCA
With the rise of the Internet came many changes to everyday life.
Arguably, one of the greatest transformations was the way the world
adapted its protection of intellectual property. Recognizing the dire
need to defend copyrights in the digital realm as well as the need to
"facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of
electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and
education in the digital age," 47 Congress developed the DMCA.
Initially propagated by the Clinton administration, the DMCA was
created to deal with the inevitable conflict between copyright protection
and the dissemination of works over the Internet. 8
Among the many contentious areas between copyright law and the
Internet, Congress noted that without a strong form of protection from
copyright-infringement liability, the incentive for ISPs to increase
efficiency and to improve existing technology faced significant
roadblocks from IP owners . 49 To address these competing interests,
Congress stated that one of its objectives in creating the DMCA was
simultaneously to clarify liability facing ISPs and to promote the online
environment as a place to disperse copyrighted works.5 ° Indeed,
Congress was aware that copyright owners would be justifiably hesitant
to place their works on the Internet should there be no readily available
method to protect them against the potential "massive piracy" that
could result from Internet distribution .
While there was a consensus about the DMCA's desired effect,
there was great disagreement about how to accomplish it.52 The
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights created a developmental
report, called the "White Paper," which advocated making ISPs strictly
liable for their users' copyright infringement. 53 Among the reasons the
White Paper held this view was that ISPs are more aware than
copyright owners of the identities and actions of their users. Thus, ISPs
47. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
48. Emily Zarins, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act's Safe Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV. 257, 263 (2004).
49. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2, 8 (1998).
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id.
52. See Zarins, supra note 48, at 264-66.
53. THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
114, 122 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/
ipnii.pdf.
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arguably are more capable of detecting and preventing infringing uses."
Further, in rejecting the notion that knowledge should be a necessary
element for ISP liability, the White Paper noted that copyright
infringement could be accomplished without intent or inquiry into the
infringer's state of mind.55 The White Paper concluded that ISPs could
mitigate their copyright liability by declining to provide service to
infringing users, requiring proof of licensing, and requiring
indemnification and warranty agreements from all users.56
While the White Paper promoted the strict-liability avenue for
ISPs, it also acknowledged the many viable arguments against it. 57 Most
notably, the report recognized the strong ISP contention that, given the
volume of information the ISPs would be responsible for, it would be
impossible for ISPs to monitor and identify infringing material.58
Furthermore, even if they were capable of such a feat, the ISPs would
be statutorily prohibited by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
from accessing any stored communications without authorization.59
Moreover, critics of the White Paper questioned why it neglected
to consider other arguably analogous case law regarding landlord-tenant
relationships. 6 For instance, likening the landlord to an ISP, one case
implied that liability should not flow to the ISP given the limited
61
capacity it has to supervise and inspect its respective digital premises.
Further, commentators argued that extending ISP responsibility to these
areas would cause ISPs to monitor and significantly reduce the amount
of information they allow online-impeding information dissemination,
increasing the costs of ISP services, and chilling free exchange.62
Ultimately, these arguments carried the day for ISPs; Congress refused
to enact many of the White Paper's ideas.63
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id. at 101. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
56. THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 123.
57. Id. at 114-15.
58. Id. at 115.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyight Grab,
WIRED, Jan. 1996, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/
white.paperpr.html; Zarins, supra note 48, at 266.
60. Samuelson, supra note 59.
61. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D.
Cal. 1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
62. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the
Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board
Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 406-07 (1995); Zarins, supra note 48,
at 266.
63. Zarins, supra note 48, at 267.
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Into this contentious environment came the California district-court
decision in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., which inadvertently helped dictate the
direction of ISPs' liability under the DMCA. 6 The Church of
Scientology sued a former member, Dennis Erlich, who was allegedly
posting the church's copyrighted information on the Internet by using a
bulletin-board service (BBS) that used Netcom On-Line
Communications (Netcom) as an ISP.65 When Religious Technology
Center petitioned the BBS and Netcom to cease allowing Erlich to post,
both companies refused its request and were consequently added as
defendants under a direct-copyright-infringement theory.66
Even though Religious Technology Center recognized that direct
copyright infringement does not normally "require intent or any
particular state of mind, ' ' 67 the court still held that Religious
Technology Center had not shown the requisite likelihood of success on
the merits for a preliminary injunction against the BBS and Netcom.68
Directly contradicting the theories espoused in the White Paper,
Religious Technology Center stated that "Ja]lthough copyright is a strict
liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or
causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party." 69 Moreover, Religious Technology
Center denied that this "volition" requirement could be satisfied by the
ISP's "warning to delete the message" but noted that it could be
relevant to a contributory infringement theory."
Religious Technology Center left open the question of whether
Netcom could be liable as a contributory infringer7" but noted that "a
mere unsupported allegation of infringement by a copyright owner"
may not be adequate to establish the knowledge required for
contributory liability.72 In advocating what can best be described as a
balancing of the burdens analysis for the knowledge requirement, the
court stated:
64. See H.R. REr. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
65. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
66. Id. at 1366.
67. Id. at 1367.
68. Id. at 1383.
69. Id. at 1370.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1374.
72. Id.
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Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the
lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright
holder's failure to provide the necessary documentation to
show that there is a likely infringement, the operator's lack of
knowledge will be found reasonable .... .
Thus, Netcom acknowledged that if it had actually looked at
Erlich's posting after receiving the notice, it would have initiated an
investigation for possible copyright infringement. The court, therefore,
left open the question of whether Netcom could be subject to
contributory liability. 4 The court opined that once Netcom had
knowledge of Erlich's infringing use of its services, it had a duty to
"take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs'
copyrighted works. "7 Still, the court equitably balanced this obligation
with the recognition that making ISPs responsible for monitoring all
messages going through their systems could "have a serious chilling
effect on what some say may turn out to be the best public forum for
free speech yet devised."
76
Congress evidently was more impressed with the reasoning of
Religious Technology Center than it was with the White Paper. The
House Report for enactment of the On-Line Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act explicitly endorsed Religious Technology
Center.77 This report eventually became the predicate for the DMCA's
safe-harbor provision. 8  Indeed, in discussing the necessity of
narrowing and clarifying the liability of ISPs, the House Report
referred to Religious Technology Center as "the leading and most
thoughtful judicial decision to date.", 79 While being tentative not to
"embark[] upon a wholesale clarification" of the doctrines of
contributory and vicarious liability, the Senate Report also tacitly
endorsed Religious Technology Center by stating that it had "decided to
leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, . . .create a series
of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of service providers."80
Through this relative codification of Religious Technology Center's
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1374-75.
75. Id. at 1375.
76. Id. at 1377-78.
77. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998).
78. Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 116 (2006).
79. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998).
80. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
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principles, the safe-harbor provision enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 512 of
the DMCA came to be.8
B. Details of the DMCA Safe-Harbor Provision
In order for an ISP to qualify for the safe harbor,82 the alleged
infringement generally has to occur during one of four basic activities:
(1) transitory digital-network communications, (2) system caching, (3)
storing information at the direction of the user, or (4) providing an
information-location tool. 83 Furthermore, to protect ISPs' good-faith
actions to help mitigate infringement, the provision provides that "[a]ny
person who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . (1) that material or
activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or
disabled by mistake or misidentification" will be liable for any resulting
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, to the affected ISPs.84
These limitations were designed to immunize ISPs from liability for
contributory infringement and to provide "strong incentives" to foster
cooperation between ISPs and copyright owners in the fight against
copyright infringement on the Internet.85
To qualify for this relief from liability, ISPs must comply with
certain stipulations set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 6 Among the
conditions are the requirements that ISPs not only adopt and implement
procedures that allow for termination of repeat infringers but also
inform users of the policy's existence. 87 This provision also imposes an
obligation on ISPs to accommodate technologies "that are used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and . . . do
not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens
on their systems or networks. ,88
While these prerequisites apply to ISPs seeking limited liability
under any of the subsections, ISPs that provide services other than
transitory digital communications must also satisfy the notice and
takedown provision of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The takedown provision
places an affirmative duty on ISPs to "act[] expeditiously to remove, or
81. Scott, supra note 78, at 116.
82. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
83. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000). Recognizing that these protections
may not extend far enough, Congress also extended the safe-harbor provision to
provide limited liability to nonprofit educational institutions that act as ISPs for faculty
and graduate students performing teaching or researching functions. Id. § 512(e).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 512(0(1)-(2).
85. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
87. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
88. Id. § 512(i)(2)(C).
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disable access to, the material" that is claimed to be infringing but only
"upon obtaining such knowledge" of infringement or "aware[ness] of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent." 89
The takedown provision is thus predicated on the fact that the ISP does
not have control over or receive financial benefit from the infringing
activity.'
Although the statute places no duty on an ISP performing certain
services to monitor its service for activity, the statute does create what
the House Report referred to as a "red flag test" to determine when an
ISP has a duty to act.9' In order to pass this test and to maintain their
limited liability, ISPs must take action whenever they become aware of
"facts or circumstances" that raise a "red flag" as to the possibility that
infringing activity is occurring.92 This test is thus comprised of both an
objective and subjective portion-an ISP must not subjectively be aware
of facts and circumstances that would lead "a reasonable person
operating under the same or similar circumstances, 93 to conclude that
there is infringing activity.
This red flag can be raised, for example, when a user gives the
ISP a notification in compliance with the takedown provision. To
permit this sort of notification, the ISP must designate and list an agent
with the Register of Copyrights specifically designed to receive it.
94
Among various other procedural requirements, such as providing
contact information and identifying the alleged infringing activity, 95 the
notice must include "[a] statement that the complaining party has a
good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is
not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law."
96
The statute further requires that the copyright owner "comply
substantially" with certain requirements of the takedown provision in
order to ascribe sufficient knowledge to the ISP. 97 However, as long as
the complaining party substantially identifies the copyrighted material
and infringing activity and provides contact information, the ISP must
89. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
90. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
91. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(2).
95. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).
96. Id. § 512(c)(3)(v). This provision seems to cross reference the fact that
anyone who "materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is infringing ...
shall be liable for any damages . . . incurred" as a result of the misrepresentation. See
id. § 512(f)(1)-(2).
97. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
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contact the complaining party or take other reasonable steps to bring the
notification into compliance.98
Once the ISP receives a substantially compliant takedown notice
and "acts expeditiously" to remove or disable access to the material," it
must notify the subscriber that the material has been removed.'0° The
subscriber is subsequently permitted to provide a counternotification
that includes "[a] statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber
has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a
result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or
disabled." 101 If the alleged infringer takes advantage of this procedure,
then the ISP must inform the copyright owner that the ISP will replace
or "cease disabling access to" the contested material within ten business
days after receipt of the counternotification. "0
To prevent the ISP from returning the material, the copyright
owner must inform the designated agent that an action has been brought
against the alleged infringer within this time frame.1 3 To facilitate this
process and to allow the action to be brought against the correct
individual, the statute permits "the clerk of any United States district
court to issue a subpoena" requiring that an ISP disclose the
identification of the alleged infringer "to the extent such information is
available to the service provider.""
C Section 512 Protection in a Nutshell
Section 512(a) provides the broadest protection for ISPs that
provide transmission and routing services and are thus mere conduits of
information. 105  These providers-typically high-speed-Internet,
broadband, and DSL providers-receive safe harbor from their users'
infringement activities without any requirement that they take down
allegedly infringing material.'0 6 The only condition of their safe harbor
is that they adopt a policy for terminating repeat infringers and
accommodate technical protection measures.107
98. See id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
99. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
100. Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
101. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
102. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
103. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
104. Id. § 512(h)(1), (3).
105. Id. § 512(a).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 512(a)(1)-(5), (b)(2)(C)-(E).
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Sections 512(c) and (d) apply to ISPs providing hosting services 1°8
and search engines. The takedown provision applies mainly to these
providers. To receive the safe harbor from liability, these providers are
required to remove allegedly infringing content upon receipt of notice
from the copyright holder.'09 The § 512(c) process requires that the ISP
(1) "expeditiously" take down the information, (2) notify the alleged
infringer that the material has been removed,110 and (3) forward any
counternotices from alleged infringers back to the original
complainant. "1 ' If after ten to fourteen days the complainant does not
notify the ISP that it has filed an action against the alleged infringer,
then the ISP may put back the material. 112
A brief mention of the anticircumvention provision and § 512 may
also be of interest. Section 1201 of the DMCA makes it illegal to make
available "anticircumvention" devices or links to anticircumvention
devices.'13 It is interesting, however, that illegal circumvention by
itself, at least in the view of one court, cannot be the subject of a § 512
notice since it is separate and distinct from copyright infringement.114 It
thus appears that the safe-harbor provisions arguably do not apply to
this section.15 Section 1201 seems to offer quasi-trade-secret protection
because it essentially prohibits one from obtaining or accessing
something that is being kept secret, such as the technological measures
that protect the copyrighted work."6 Thus, favorable rulings upholding
the validity of the anticircumvention provision may offer promise to a
trade-secret-takedown statute.117
108. Hosting services include Web sites, forums, blogs, and social networking
sites.
109. Id. § 512(c)-(d).
110. Search engines are not required to provide notice to the alleged infringer.
See id. § 512(d).
111. Id. § 512(g)(2).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 1201.
114. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ('Section 512(c) provides protection only from liability for copyright
infringement. Plaintiffs seek to hold defendants liable not for copyright infringement,
but for a violation of § 1201(a)(2), which applies only to circumvention products and
technologies.") (internal citations omitted).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1)(A).
116. It provides even greater protection than that afforded under trade-secret
law in that it appears to prevent reverse engineering. It prohibits trafficking in
technology that can circumvent technological measures employed by the copyright
owner. Id. § 1201.
117. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454-55 (2d
Cir. 2001) (upholding an injunction under the anticircumvention provision and finding
that the government had a substantial interest in preventing unauthorized access to
encrypted copyrighted material).
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D. Summary of DMCA Criticisms
Much has been written about the DMCA takedown provision.'
Many commentators believe that copyright holders have abused the
takedown provision" 9 and that the provision could be improved by
better balancing the benefits to copyright owners with the protections
for posters of allegedly infringing material. E° Despite the provision's
weaknesses (perceived or actual), however, it has achieved the intended
purposes that spurred the legislation: it clarifies ISP liability for
contributory copyright infringement and promotes the distribution of
copyrighted works over the Internet. 2 ' This Article does not address
changes to the DMCA's safe-harbor provision. Rather, this Article
simply uses the provision as a starting point from which to design a
trade-secret-takedown provision that is carefully tailored to the
principles of trade-secret law while also being mindful of the lessons
learned from the DMCA.
One recent study attempted an empirical analysis of 876 DMCA
takedown notices collected by the Chilling Effects 22 project 23 The
118. See, e.g., HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 41, at 8; Michael Driscoll, Will
YouTube Sail into the DMCA's Safe Harbor or Sink for Internet Piracy 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 550, 566-68 (2007), available at http://
www.jmripl.com/publications/vol6/issue3/driscoll.pdf; Malta Pollack, Rebalancing
Section 512 To Protect Fair Users from Herds of Mice-Trampling Elephants, or a Little
Due Process Is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 547, 547-48, 554 (2006); Scott, supra note 78, 128-35; Urban & Quilter,
supra note 8, at 640. Approximately forty-four law-review articles published this year
and last year discuss the DMCA takedown provision. Only about three articles discuss
the legislation overall in a positive light. These articles are: Emily Favre, Online
Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect Brand Integrity Against
Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 165, 199-201 (2007); Britton Payne, Super-Grokster:
Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering
Solution for Infringing Digital Creations, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 939 (2006); Yiman Zhang, Establishing Secondary Liability with a Higher Degree
of Culpability. Redefining Chinese Internet Copyright Law to Encourage Technology
Development, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 257, 281-82 (2007). Half of the remainder of
the forty-four law-review articles that discuss the DMCA takedown provision express
criticisms of the provision, while the other half are neutral. The searches were
conducted in the LexisNexis "US Law Reviews and Journals" database (DMCA and
"take down" [from 12/31/2005 through 07/29/2007]) and in Westlaw's "Journal and
Law Reviews" database (dmca & "take-down" & da[after 12/31/2005]).
119. See, e.g., Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 688.
120. See, e.g., id.
121. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
122. Since its inception in 2002, the Chilling Effects Web site has invited the
public and ISPs to submit cease-and-desist and takedown letters that they have received
from copyright holders. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/
dmca5l2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
123. Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 641-42.
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study's authors, Professor Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter, noted
several concerns regarding the takedown notices, including (1) serious
legal questions relating to the merits of the underlying copyright claims,
(2) failure to comply with statutory requirements in the written notice,
and (3) use of the notices to address claims other than copyright
infringement. '24
In another study, Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beckles of the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law used
a variety of research methods to examine "how well fair use and
similar free expression safeguards in IP law are working." 125 As part of
the study, they reviewed all of the DMCA takedown notices from 2004
on the Chilling Effects Web site.126 While they found that over half of
the notices appeared to state valid claims for copyright or trademark
infringement, 127 they nonetheless expressed concern over the
"censorship power that the law puts in the hands of IP owners." '12 8 In
particular, the authors noted that over a fifth of the notices either
represented weak claims or were subject to strong fair-use or First
Amendment defenses. 129
V. ANATOMY OF THE LEGISLATION
This Section does not assume the intricate task of drafting trade-
secret-takedown legislation. However, it is mindful of existing trade-
secret-law principles in suggesting solutions. It also offers several
points for consideration by identifying some of the potentially thorny
issues that may arise from trade-secret regulation. The lessons learned
from the implementation of § 512 of the DMCA are certainly helpful
and provide guidance on the direction of the trade-secret endeavor.
Those lessons, together with an understanding of the theory and
practice of trade-secret law, could be instructive if Congress were to
create this legislation.
The form of a trade-secret-takedown provision could be an
expansion of the DMCA, an expansion of the Economic Espionage
124. Id. at 667-78.
125. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 41, at 8.
126. Id.
127. Section 512's safe-harbor provision does not apply to trademark
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135
F. Supp. 2d 409, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to grant ISP's motion to dismiss
where trademark infringement allegedly occurred on a Web site hosted by the ISP).
128. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 41, at 36.
129. Id. at 32. They reported that another twenty-seven percent of the sample
covered material, by their assessment, was possibly protected under fair use or the First
Amendment. Id.
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Act,13° or a creation of an original body of legislation. The actual
process by which material would be removed could be very similar to
that established under the DMCA, subject to some modification to
accommodate the concerns raised below. In short, the complainant
would provide notice of the alleged inappropriate posting of the trade
secret to the ISP. Upon receipt of the notice, the ISP would need to
remove the material within a very short period of time (probably within
five hours).13 ' The trade-secret owner would then file a complaint in
court within a certain number of days (probably ten days) or provide
proof to the ISP of an agreement with the alleged misappropriator.
Failure to take this step would result in automatic return of the
information to the Web site. A notice provision to alert the subscriber
of the takedown could be required, but the nature of a counternotice
requirement is less clear.
A. Safe Harbor
It is worth considering whether the framework of a safe harbor is
the best approach for trade-secret-takedown legislation. It probably is
the optimal context in which to place a takedown requirement because it
is difficult to find other workable incentives that encourage ISPs to be
observant or other rubrics that could legitimately compel ISPs'
compliance.' 32 An important component of misappropriation under
trade-secret law, particularly in the context of intermediary liability, is
knowledge that the information is another's trade secret.133 A person is
liable for misappropriation if he or she turns a blind eye to or ignores
the use of another's trade secret. 34 Accordingly, ISPs could be liable
130. The Economic Espionage Act, enacted in 1996, criminalizes trade-secret
theft and misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2000).
131. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (explaining the need for
promptness).
132. Professor Lemley proposes a uniform safe-harbor provision for ISPs that
covers all areas of intellectual property. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet
Safe Harbors (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/
tprc/papers/2007/660/rationalizingintemetsafeharbors.pdf. This would be an interesting
alternative to the current piecemeal approach to safe harbors. His suggestion,
nonetheless, further provides support for the safe-harbor framework as the best
approach for addressing these kinds of harms.
133. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., No. 93 C 1601, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3221, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998) (explaining that constructive notice is
sufficient to show that information was a trade secret).
134. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407
N.E.2d 319, 324 (Mass. 1980) (reasoning that a defendant cannot shield himself by
"studious ignorance of pertinent 'warning' facts" (quoting R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 5.04[2] (1978)).
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for misappropriation when they transmit information in violation of
trade-secret law with knowledge that the information is protectable.1 35
Weighed against the realities of the tremendous burden that it would
impose upon ISPs to police their users' content (at least with today's
technology), a safe harbor appears to be a fair balance. The trade-secret
owner bears the burden of monitoring the Internet, but the ISP, once
notified, must take action to remove allegedly misappropriated material
in order to avoid potential liability.
Overall, however, it is desirable to tie actual potential for liability
to the kind of service offered by the ISPs. Not doing so, (i.e., being
overinclusive) increases the chances of takedown notices being sent to
virtually every kind of ISP, even if liability would be extremely
unlikely based on the kind of services offered.1 36 It would not only
create a high compliance burden on ISPs, it would also magnify the
potential for a chilling effect on speech as ISPs acting in their best
interest comply with notices to preserve their immunity-even if
liability would be remote.137 For this reason, ISPs who are mere
conduits are exempted under this proposal. 
138
B. Dealing with Frivolous Requests
Because of the potential for misuse of a takedown for trade secrets,
a complaining trade-secret owner's takedown notice should be
accompanied by a bond or fee. Under the DMCA, a complainant needs
a subjective "good faith belief" of infringement to request a
takedown.139 Although a similar requirement makes sense for trade
secrets, some additional assurance is probably necessary to counteract
illegitimate uses of the mechanism. The required fee should be costly
enough for large companies yet not so expensive that it would be
prohibitive for small businesses. Perhaps something akin to the posting
of a bond for the granting of preliminary injunctive relief could be a
helpful model. 14 Alternatively, it could be a fee to the ISP as
compensation for having to divert its resources to removing or disabling
information within hours of receiving a takedown request.
135. See id.
136. See generally Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 667-68.
137. See, e.g., id.; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 41, at 36.
138. See infra Part VI.C.
139. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003
(9th Cir. 2004).
140. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
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In addition, there should be a statutory remedy for a frivolous
takedown request.14 An alleged infringer whose material is improperly
subjected to a takedown under the DMCA has a remedy against the
copyright owner if a knowing material misrepresentation was made in
the notice to the ISP. 142 For example, in Online Policy Group v.
Diebold, Inc., 143 a federal district court in California concluded as a
matter of law that Diebold had "knowingly materially misrepresented"
that publication of its e-mail archive exposing weaknesses in its voting
machines was protected by copyright law. This misrepresentation was
material because the takedown notice caused the Web sites to remove
their e-mail archives.", Ironically, the contents of the e-mails might
have been protectable under trade-secret law.
An analogous bad-faith-type standard seems appropriate for a
trade-secret-takedown provision. While the standard may be difficult to
meet depending on the particular circumstances of a case, it should not
necessarily be any lower because the complexity and unpredictability of
trade-secret law would likely render any other standard too difficult for
trade-secret owners. Just as in Diebold, courts would expect that if a
trade-secret owner submits a takedown notice for material that a court
determines that the owner should have known was not protectable as a
trade secret 45 (e.g., the owner had not taken adequate steps to protect
the information), then liability under a "knowingly material
misrepresentation" standard could be satisfied. Indeed, trade-secret law
provides support for penalizing a trade-secret owner for asserting a
trade-secret claim in bad faith. Thus, an extension of this principle in
this context would be entirely consistent. " It is also important because
the nature of trade-secret law is such that there is no "prima facie"
certification of a trade secret that a trade-secret owner can present or
upon which an ISP can rely for verification.'47
141. Under the DMCA, if an owner misrepresented its claim in the takedown
notice, then the owner is liable to the ISP for any damages resulting from an improper
removal of material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2000).
142. Id. Under § 512(f) any of the parties involved may be awarded damages,
costs, and attorneys' fees if either the copyright owner or the alleged infringer makes a
knowing, material misrepresentation in a notice or counternotice. Id.
143. 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
144. Id. at 1204 (interpreting § 512(f)).
145. Evidence supporting the strength of the trade-secret claim would be
relevant to the trade-secret owner's alleged bad faith in asserting the claim. See CVD,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir. 1985).
146. See, e.g., id. (ruling in the context of an antitrust claim that "the assertion
of a trade secret claim in bad faith, in an attempt to monopolize, can be a violation of
the antitrust laws.") (internal citations omitted).
147. See infra Part VI.B.
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C. Carveout for Mere Conduits
ISPs that only provide transmission and routing services and are
merely conduits of alleged trade secrets should be exempt from the
takedown-notice procedure for two reasons.' 48 First, as a practical
matter, because material resides on their users' computers rather than
on the ISPs' servers, the ISPs have no ability to remove offending
material from their systems."' Second, it is highly unlikely that the
mere transmission of trade-secret information under these
circumstances would constitute actionable trade-secret
misappropriation. Accordingly, since liability would not be well-
grounded in trade-secret law, it makes little sense to include these
transmitters as part of the takedown scheme; in fact, doing so would
impose unnecessary costs and burdens to comply. 1
50
D. Carveout for the Press
Because liability for trade-secret misappropriation against
publishers in established news organizations is currently unsettled and,
indeed, any consensus (to the extent one exists) points away from such
liability, it may be advisable to exempt "established news
organizations" 15' from the takedown statute. In particular, where
members of such organizations both played no part in illegally
obtaining a trade secret that is a matter of public concern and lawfully
accessed the trade secret, current Supreme Court jurisprudence appears
to shield the press from liability for disclosure under the First
Amendment.' 52 To be clear, providing a carveout in this statute for the
148. Congress, in § 512(a), codified the decision in Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("It would be
especially inappropriate to hold liable a service that acts more like a conduit, in other
words, one that does not itself keep an archive of files for more than a short
duration."). It thus preserves immunity for ISPs that do no more than move packets of
information on the Internet. See H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 19-20 (1998) (Conf.
Rep.).
149. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 675 (discussing § 512(a) takedown
notices to ISPs acting as conduits).
150. To the extent there is concern about the possibility of liability, a blanket
safe harbor or exemption from liability for these providers may be advisable.
151. This phrase is meant to capture traditional news organizations, such as
television stations, newspapers, and magazines, that have editorial staff who review and
make decisions about publication. The phrase excludes bloggers, Web-site operators,
and all nontraditional newspersons. See infra Part VI.A. 1.a (discussing such persons'
legal status as publishers).
152. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001); infra Part VII.A.2.
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press does not provide immunity. Rather, where the trade secret
appears on a Web site belonging to a covered news organization, a
trade-secret owner could not use the takedown statute to have the
information removed. Instead, the currently existing process of filing
suit and moving for a preliminary injunction would be required.
This carveout is further supported by other considerations that aim
to make the provisions of the proposed legislation consistent with
current principles of trade-secret law. For instance, one practical effect
of having the deliberative review of information by an editorial staff
before it is posted or published is that it serves as a filter for the intent
of the poster: information that is newsworthy, rather than information
which is posted mainly to exact revenge or to harm a trade-secret
owner, is more likely to be protected. 153 Furthermore, it would be
consistent with the privilege in trade-secret law to disclose trade secrets
that are "relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a
crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern." 154
From a practical perspective, it would also mean that the Wall Street
Journal or the New York Times would not need to take down news
articles from their online editions that nonetheless appear in the print
version of the newspaper.
E. Subpoena Provision
Similar to the DMCA, a provision permitting the trade-secret
owner to obtain a subpoena for the identity155  of the alleged
misappropriator might be of value. 156 Nonetheless, recognizing that this
kind of provision could be fraught with hazards, a careful analysis-
perhaps including an evaluation of the implementation of the DMCA's
corollary provision-would be wise. For instance, the subpoena
provision in § 512 does not appear to apply to ISPs who are mere
conduits, that is, those who do not store material on their servers.1
57
153. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (recommending a
focus on whether there was intent to disseminate the information to the public at the
beginning of the news gathering process).
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995).
155. A key first step in filing suit against an alleged misappropriator is to
obtain the identity of the individual. Cundiff, supra note 2, at 409.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000). The subpoena is granted on the condition
that the identity will only be used in relation to the protection of the intellectual-
property rights of the copyright owner. Id. § 512(h)(2)(C).
157. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc.,
351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("We conclude from both the terms of § 512(h)
and the overall structure of § 512 that ...a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP
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Whether it should remain the same for trade secrets and the
implications flowing from any resulting position would be an important
consideration.
The ability to subpoena the identity of an alleged misappropriator
would permit a trade-secret owner to pursue a misappropriation action
against the individual posting the information,"' as is required under
this proposal. However, the provision must be carefully tailored to
avoid abuses. 159 The DMCA subpoena provision empowers a court
clerk, not a judge, to issue the subpoena. While the application for the
subpoena must be accompanied by the takedown notice, additional
safeguards should be required to help ensure, for instance, that (1) the
subpoena is sought by a bona-fide owner of a trade secret, (2) it is
intended to be used for the exclusive purpose of enforcing trade-secret
rights, and (3) the alleged misappropriator has notice and an
opportunity to object to its issuance.' 6° These considerations must
nevertheless balance the inherent tensions between offering adequate
protections to the subscriber and the trade-secret owner while also
maintaining a speedy and efficient process.
F. Counterotice Not Required
Section 512 allows an ISP "subscriber"'16' to submit a
counternotice contesting an allegation of copyright infringement.
62
After receiving a counternotice claiming that the targeted material is not
engaged in storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing
activity.").
158. One potential problem with obtaining subpoenas based on the Internet
Protocol (IP) address of a computer is that the owner of the computer may not
necessarily have been the alleged misappropriator. Someone else could have used the
computer. See, e.g., Emily Umbright, DMCA Proof Internet Law Still Evolving, ST.
Louis DAILY REC., Aug. 29, 2003 (discussing the music industry's subpoenas to alleged
copyright infringers).
159. See generally Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 10, at 1594-98 (discussing tort
actions against anonymous defendants).
160. The burden could be placed on the ISP or the alleged misappropriator to
obtain a protective order against issuance of the subpoena, or to have it quashed.
161. The DMCA does not define "subscriber," but the context in which the
term is used suggests that a subscriber is one who has an account or similar business
relationship with the ISP. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (2000) (referring to "a subscriber
of the service provider"). Thus, "subscriber" would not include, for instance, a person
contributing to ongoing discussions in newsgroups.
162. Id. § 512(g)(3). The provisions do not require notice before the material
has been removed; notice has been required only after it has been removed. See id. §
512(g)(2)(A).
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infringing,163 the ISP must notify, within ten business days, the party
providing the notice of the subscriber's objection." If after receiving
such notice the copyright owner does not file suit within fourteen days,
the material must then be reposted.165 While notice of the takedown to
the subscriber is important, it is worth rethinking whether a
counternotice should be required and for what purpose.
To some extent, a counternotice may not be an effective
component for a trade-secret takedown. First, the filing of a lawsuit
under § 512 appears contingent upon the alleged misappropriator
providing the counternotice. Unless the subscriber submits a
counternotice, nothing in the statute requires the copyright owner to file
an action. 166 However, in order to provide tighter restrictions and help
avoid potential abuses by trade-secret owners, this proposal requires
that complainants file suit or provide proof of an agreement with the
alleged misappropriator to avoid the material being put back within a
short period of time. 167 The alleged misappropriator may request the put
back after the requisite time has passed by providing notice to the ISP
with a copy to the complainant. Initiating a lawsuit may present
practical difficulties for trade-secret owners, but this requirement could
serve as another safeguard against frivolous notices.
Although the ISP would be required to notify the subscriber that its
material has been removed and is the subject of a trade-secret-
misappropriation allegation, it is unclear that a counternotice procedure
would be worthwhile. 168 It is unlikely that an alleged misappropriator's
counternotice-that the information was removed by mistake or
misidentification-would sway a trade-secret owner. Thus, the
counternotice would not appear to serve a substantive purpose. Perhaps
the result may be different if a counternotice (containing more than just
a summary denial) were part of a procedure whereby a third party (like
an arbitrator) would make a preliminary determination about the merit
163. By way of defense, the counternotice merely requires a statement under
penalty of perjury that the material was removed by mistake or misidentification. Id. §
512(g)(3)(C).
164. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
165. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). Material which has been taken down is apparently
unlikely to be put back. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 670-80 (surmising that a
possible reason is because alleged infringers move the material to another hosting
service).
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).
167. See supra Part V.
168. While it seems unfair, on some level, not to allow a response from the
person who posted the allegedly trade-secret information, unless a substantively useful
purpose for the countemotification can be identified, the end result would be a
counternotice process without a function-one that serves no purpose other than to
create paperwork or the appearance of providing due process.
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of the complainant's claim. The nature of trade-secret law, however, is
such that it would be, at best, very difficult to make such a finding in
an abbreviated manner or forum. There is no clear defense, such as a
certificate of ownership of the trade secret, that the challenger can
present to establish some presumption of a meritorious defense.
G. Strict Compliance Required
Given the fluid nature in which trade secrets are identified as well
as the drastic ex ante restraint that a takedown requirement imposes, it
would appear that strict compliance with the notice provisions ought to
be mandatory. Thus, a provider receiving an incomplete takedown
notice may reject the notice for failure to comply with the statutory
provisions."' One of the problems facing implementation of the
DMCA's takedown provision has been the failure to comply with the
strict notice requirements.' 70 As a result, the question of whether an ISP
can be protected by the liability limitations when the takedown notice
has, for instance, failed to identify the allegedly infringing material
with sufficient specificity has been met with mixed results.' 7
Requiring compliance with the notice requirement is also
consistent with trade-secret law because in order to succeed on a
misappropriation claim, a trade-secret plaintiff must identify the alleged
trade secret with particularity. 7 2 Moreover, given the inability to
precertify a trade secret,'73 a strict compliance requirement in the trade-
secret context seems reasonable. This measure would also help alleviate
potential abuses by providing an additional incentive for those
submitting a takedown notice to be especially cautious about following
the notice requirements. In addition, it would eliminate any uncertainty
for providers that receive incomplete notices and are unsure about
whether to proceed with the takedown.
169. Technical errors that are not defects in the substance of the notice, such as
the misspelling of a name or a typographical error, may not be fatal.
170. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 667-78.
171. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620,
626 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal where the notice required that the newsgroup
host delete an entire newsgroup and finding that notice was "substantially" compliant);
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that
notice did not substantially comply with statutory notice provisions for failing to
provide sufficient information to identify the allegedly infringing auction listings).
172. See, e.g., Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d
980, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining the importance of identifying trade secrets);
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
1313 (D. Utah 1999) (granting summary judgment against the plaintiff for failure to
identify trade secrets).
173. See infra Part VI.A.
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This requirement does not espouse that a complaining trade-secret
owner must disclose the details of the trade secret publicly in its
takedown request because such disclosure would destroy the secret and
cause the very harm the law is trying to avoid. Rather, consistent with
already existing procedural practice in trade-secret-misappropriation
cases, no more than what is necessary to meet the pleading
requirements of a complaint should be provided. 17 4 Thus, the takedown
request should call for a description of the trade secret in a manner
adequate to permit the ISP to recognize and identify the objectionable
posting. The request should also identify the particular location of the
material by, for instance, a link or Web address.
H. Prospective Application
The Wal-Mart hypothetical presented at the beginning of this
Article would be different if this proposal were enacted. Upon
discovering the content of the sales circular on fatwallet.com on Friday
afternoon, Wal-Mart would immediately submit a statutorily compliant
takedown request to the operators of the Web site, along with the
required fee.' 75 The material would be removed within five hours. Wal-
Mart would obtain the identity of the poster via the subpoena provision
and would initiate an action within ten days of submitting the takedown
or submit proof of an agreement with the poster. Otherwise, the
material would be put back on the. site. Thus, by Friday evening the
information would be disabled. This is a far-shorter period of time than
the approximately seven days that may have elapsed under the current
regime. 171
174. A plaintiff must generally plead (1) ownership of a trade secret, (2)
misappropriation by the defendant, and (3) harm. See POOLEY, supra note 4, §
10.07[1]. Detailed descriptions of the trade secret are generally filed under seal and are
subject to a protective order later in the litigation. See id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)
(allowing parties to describe the nature of information that is privileged without having
to disclose or produce the privileged information itself).
175. It may also be wise to submit a takedown to the search engines, which
may have already captured the information.
176. Wal-Mart may still have to contend with the fact that some people may
have already accessed the information during the time that it was available. This is the
kind of weakness that is inevitable when trade secrets appear on the Internet. However,
the question of whether Wal-Mart may be able to enjoin its competitors from using the
information is a separate issue that will necessitate a careful consideration of several
factors, such as whether the information retained trade-secret protection despite having
appeared on the Web site for a few hours and whether the competitor knew it was a
trade secret when it came upon the information. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 29-37
(discussing a model for analyzing this kind of inquiry). Nonetheless, as part of the
analysis, Wal-Mart's argument for retaining trade-secret protection will be strengthened
by its having used the takedown provision instead of waiting about a week or more, at
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Consider another example of a well-known company's trade secret
being posted on the Internet. Assume that a disgruntled former
Microsoft employee, Dave, who had access to the top-secret source
code of a soon-to-be-released operating system, keeps the source code
after leaving the company (in violation of his agreement) and decides to
sell it on a Web site critical of Microsoft, microsoftsucks.com. 177 Dave
posts it anonymously on the site and describes it as "jacked from
Microsoft" and "not available anywhere else."
Microsoft discovers the posting immediately after it appears on the
site and contacts the Web site to have it removed. The operators refuse
to do so. Post enactment of a trade-secret-takedown provision, that
refusal would most likely be replaced by compliance because of the
promise of immunity. Assume, however, that Dave, in defending
himself in a misappropriation action, claims that the takedown
provision is unconstitutional because it violates his rights under the
First Amendment. The next Part provides a framework within which to
address such an argument.
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL CONCERNS
While the discussion above has suggested some ways to strengthen
this kind of trade-secret legislation, there may be other, more workable
solutions. Moreover, takedown legislation is only one piece of the
puzzle in dealing with the larger problem of trade secrets on the
Internet, and any real solutions must involve a multifaceted approach
that includes technological and international considerations. On
balance, the potential benefits of this legislation outweigh the
drawbacks, and it is a necessary initial step toward a resolution of the
problem. However, this Part highlights a few additional issues that
deserve consideration.
A. First Amendment Objections
One of the strongest potential challenges facing a scheme that
causes an ex ante removal of information from the Internet, without a
court having had the opportunity to issue a ruling, is the First
Amendment. "[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits limitations,
absent some extraordinary showing of governmental interest, on the
which point the information would, in all likelihood, be deemed generally known and
thus unprotectable.
177. This hypothetical is loosely based on United States v. Genovese, 409 F.
Supp. 2d 253, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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publication of information already made public." 178 When weighing
First Amendment rights against the commercial interest in protecting
trade secrets, courts are often reluctant to enjoin disclosures of trade
secrets. 179 While the kind of speech restriction proposed here presents
thorny issues, they are not insurmountable or fatal to trade-secret-
takedown legislation. Ultimately, in practical terms, the goal is to strike
the proper balance between preventing disclosures motivated by
vengeance and reprisal and permitting those that are more readily
recognized as being in the public interest. 
180
It is beyond the scope of this Article to enter the larger discussion
about the role of the First Amendment in trade-secret law.
181
Nevertheless, this Article necessitates an underlying belief about the
place of the First Amendment: limited exceptions for the use or
disclosure of another person's trade secrets without the privilege to do
so ought not constitute protected expression under the First
Amendment.' 82 As a result, First Amendment rights may trump trade-
secret protections in some circumstances, but not in most.
178. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 26-27 (Cal. 2003)
(Moreno, J., concurring).
179. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th
Cir. 1996) (refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in
violation of a protective order and noting that "[t]he private litigants' interest in
protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as
grounds for imposing a prior restraint").
180. For instance, a person may be privileged to disclose trade-secret
information "that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime
or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995). Some whistleblowing statutes also privilege
disclosures of trade secrets. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2000); N.Y. Lab. Law §
740 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007).
181. For scholars favoring trade-secret protection over First Amendment
rights, see, for example, Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual
Property. The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an
Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2001);
Epstein, supra note 29, at 1035-46; Franklin B. Goldberg, Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271, 271 (2001); Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the
Internet Age: The Battle Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J.
517, 534 (2002). For scholars advocating First Amendment rights over trade-secret
protection, see, for example, David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment, and
the Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 537, 542 (2001);
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-31 (1998); Volokh, supra note 43, at 739-48.
For a recent expression of a middle ground between the two camps, see, Pamela
Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First
Amendment, 58 Hastings L.J. 777 (2007).
182. Cf In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 779-83 (8th Cir. 2005)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that copyright infringement over the Internet is not
protected expression).
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To the extent trade-secret misappropriation often involves breaches
of contract or breaches of confidence, the First Amendment would
generally not be implicated." 3  Where the person posting the
information is under a duty or is otherwise bound by an agreement not
to disclose the trade secret, courts are more likely to address the
incident as a contractual issue and such a posting would not present
First Amendment concerns.184 Thus, when an employee discloses his or
her employer's trade secrets on the Internet, it is expected that the First
Amendment would not sanction the conduct.
Nonetheless, where a contract did not bind an alleged
misappropriator or the person posting the trade secret (a potentially
relevant distinction on the Internet), the potential for running afoul of
the First Amendment may be greater."8 5 Thus, as to company outsiders
who themselves are not bound by any duty of confidentiality, First
Amendment concerns may be implicated. 186 Accordingly, the First
Amendment question is relevant here to the extent that trade-secret
takedown legislation would cover these persons. 187 In order to frame the
issues in a succinct manner within the morass of First Amendment law,
183. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that
contracts not to speak are enforceable); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 10, at 1595
(exploring anonymous speakers and tortious speech).
184. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Am. Motors Corp. v.
Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1991); Samuelson, supra note 181, at 780
(discussing why the First Amendment is often not applicable in trade-secret cases).
185. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999). The
defendant operated a Web site with news about Ford and its products. Lane received
confidential Ford documents from an anonymous source and initially agreed not to
disclose most of the information. However, Lane eventually published some documents
relating to the quality of Ford's products on his Web site because he believed that the
public had a right to know. He did so despite knowing that the documents were
confidential. Ford sought a restraining order to prevent publication of the documents,
claiming the documents were trade secrets. The court acknowledged, without any
discussion, that Ford could show Lane had misappropriated its trade secrets, but the
court reversed the order on First Amendment grounds, concluding that considering an
injunction to prevent Lane from publishing trade secrets was a prior restraint. Id. at
747-50.
186. The First Amendment may not protect a person who tries to convert a
trade secret for economic gain. See United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253,
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
187. One interesting side note is whether ISPs would have a recognized First
Amendment right to assist in the disclosure of a trade secret. As a practical matter, the
issue will likely be moot. Since compliance with a takedown provision would provide
safe harbor to ISPs, they are unlikely to raise the issue. Beyond that, however, they are
at least one step removed from the disclosure-mere vessels or a medium to transmit
the information-thus, assertion of a right to speak appears attenuated. They are
therefore neither like the individual posting the trade secret nor like the press in the
First Amendment analysis.
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the next Section discusses what will likely be the two main First
Amendment objections to a trade-secret-takedown statute.
As long as the enacted regulation provides sufficient safeguards to
ensure that complainants are owners of protectable trade secrets and
there is recognition of certain exceptions to allow for expressions that
are in the public interest, such as the health and safety exceptions
already recognized by trade-secret law, 188 takedown legislation should
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.' 89 Moreover, the fact that the
DMCA has withstood First Amendment challenges"9 suggests that a
trade-secret-takedown provision ought to fare at least as well.
1. THE STATUTE OPERATES AS A PRIOR RESTRAINT ON SPEECH
The first objection will likely be that the statute, by providing for
the removal of information from the Internet prior to a full adjudication
on the merits, would allow a prior restraint on speech.19' Injunctive
orders are a staple of trade-secret law, however, and generally do not
offend the First Amendment." Injunctions in trade-secret law serve the
important purposes of encouraging innovation and helping to preserve
standards of commercial morality. '93  Indeed, trade-secret law
specifically provides for preliminary injunctive relief as a remedy for
misappropriation.'94 Accordingly, assuming that the majority of
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995).
189. Cf In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258-64
(D.D.C. 2003) ("[Tlhere is some level of First Amendment protection that should be
afforded to anonymous expression on the Internet, even though the degree of protection
is minimal where alleged copyright infringement is the expression at issue."), rev'd on
other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the DMCA
provided sufficient safeguards).
190. See, e.g., id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454-
55 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding an injunction under the anticircumvention provision and
finding that the government has a substantial interest in preventing unauthorized access
to encrypted copyrighted material). More generally, the Supreme Court has made clear
that the First Amendment does. not protect speech that infringes copyright. See Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985).
191. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH §§ 15:1, 15:2 (West 2007).
192. See Samuelson, supra note 181, at 780 (discussing why the First
Amendment is often not applicable in trade secret cases).
193. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003).
194. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005)
("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 (1995). This legislative authority for granting injunctive
relief is significant in the First Amendment analysis since the Supreme Court justices in
the Pentagon Papers case (often cited for free-speech and trade-secret issues) were
concerned about the lack of legislative authority to enjoin the press from publishing
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removals under the statute will involve persons who have posted
information in violation of an agreement, duty not to disclose, or with
knowledge that the trade secret was misappropriated, the prior-restraint
argument is likely without merit. 195 Where the argument carries greater
weight, however, includes circumstances involving journalists or news
organizations publishing arguably newsworthy trade secrets."
However, the carveout for established news organizations alleviates this
concern. 197
a. Internet posters analogous to traditional media?
A very important, yet open, question that will have a significant
effect on the discussion of Internet trade secrets and the First
Amendment is whether courts will treat Internet posters as traditional
media publishers. In O'Grady v. Superior Court,' s the California Court
of Appeals chose not to distinguish a person who published information
on his Web site from "publishers who provide news to the public
through traditional print and broadcast media. "' 99 The focus of that case
was on whether Apple Computer, Inc., could discover information
about anonymous sources that had provided allegedly trade-secret
information to the Web site.
200
Even if reasoning similar to that in O'Grady were to be the widely
adopted view on the question of Internet publishers' entitlement to First
Amendment protections, it is unlikely that Internet postings of trade
secrets would receive broad protection under the First Amendment.
First, clarification of "publisher" in the context of the Internet would
be necessary. For instance, it is uncertain whether bloggers should or
documents that potentially threatened national security. N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 731-33 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
195. For cases providing injunctive relief without implicating the First
Amendment, see, for example, Comprehensive Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans,
Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 738-40 (4th Cir. 1993); Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc.,
790 F.2d 1195, 1197-98, 1208 (5th Cir. 1986); SIHandling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753
F.2d 1244, 1254-55 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253,
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
196. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317-18 (1994) (holding
that a preliminary injunction against a television network was a prior restraint); Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a preliminary injunction against a magazine publisher was a prior restraint);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 261-62 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(characterizing a preliminary injunction against a newspaper as prior restraint).
197. See supra Part IV.D.
198. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
199. Id. at 106.
200. Id. at 76.
1075
1076 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
would be treated as traditional publishers or journalists for First
Amendment purposes.2"1 Second, because even traditional publishers
and journalists may not always be shielded under the First Amendment
(depending on the nature of their conduct), 20 2 trade-secret owners may
prevail against First Amendment defenses. It is therefore important to
realize that of all the possible conduct the statute may capture, only a
small subgroup (the quasi-journalist Internet posters) may possibly raise
meritorious prior-restraint concerns.
b. Adequate safeguards
Regardless of whether the statute is deemed content neutral or
content based,20 3 prudence would direct that it should contain adequate
safeguards to survive First Amendment scrutiny .2 4 Thus, provisions
201. Seeid. at 102-03 n.21.
202. This appears to be an unsettled area of the law. Cf Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Va. 1995). The court held:
Because there is no evidence that The Post abused any confidence,
committed an impropriety, violated any court order or committed any other
improper act in gathering information from the court file or down loading
information from the Internet, there is no possible liability for The Post in
its acquisition of the information.
Id. at 1369. Some Supreme Court cases also support the proposition that the conduct of
a publisher may be taken into consideration in deciding whether to grant First
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70
(1991) (reasoning that the press may be restricted from publishing information it
unlawfully obtains without offending the First Amendment); Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding an order prohibiting a newspaper's
publication of information obtained through the discovery process). Barmicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (addressing whether the media may be liable for using
information unlawfully obtained by a third party); MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A.
ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW 536-47 (7th ed. 2005). But
see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in violation of a
protective order); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich.
1999) (refusing to enjoin publication where no fiduciary duty or confidentiality
agreement exists).
203. This kind of regulation is likely to be deemed content neutral. See DVD
Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 11 (Cal. 2003) (finding that an
injunction to protect statutorily created trade-secret rights was content neutral in that it
promoted the goals of trade-secret law unrelated to the content). However, at least one
commentator has argued otherwise. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 43, at 741 ("Even if
the [trade-secret] law [as applied to third parties] is seen as content-neutral, it can't be
defended as a time, place, and manner restriction, because it doesn't leave open ample
alternative channels . . ").
204. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957) (upholding
a statute permitting prepublication injunctions of allegedly obscene books where the
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such as (1) the requirement of a bond to accompany a takedown
request, (2) the temporary nature of the removal prior to court
intervention, (3) the requirement of court intervention (i.e., filing a
lawsuit) in a very short period, and (4) the remedy for a bad-faith
takedown request serve to mitigate potential problems. °5 It is also
worth noting that the information would have already been posted.
Thus, the removal would not be a prior restraint in the traditional sense
but would be more like an interruption of the speech until a court can
201 207rule on the merits. While this fact by itself is not determinative in
the analysis, it may provide some perspective to the discussion.
c. Lesser protection for commercial speech
An additional perspective in the First Amendment analysis is that
the statute implicates both core speech, which is generally the focus of
the prior-restraint cases208 and commercial speech.2°9 Trade-secret law
protects business information, and, as such, it is expected that business
legal standards for issuing the injunction were clear and there were procedural
safeguards in place).
205. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (explaining
that content-based restraints must contain such safeguards, such as expeditious judicial
review, brevity of the restraint, and burden of proof on the censor). Content-neutral
regulations do not require such heightened procedural safeguards. Id. at 322.
206. The term prior restraint describes "administrative and judicial orders
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur." MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 4.03 (1984) (emphasis added).
207. This is likely a "prior administrative restraint," which requires similar
procedural protections as traditional prior restraints. See Ctr. For Democracy & Tech.
v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 656-57 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
208. See generally Edith L. Pacillo, Note, Getting A Feminist Foot in the
Courtroom Door." Media Liability for Personal Injury Caused by Pornography, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 123, 130-33 (1994) (discussing the continuum in free-speech
analysis).
209. The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech that does
"no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). Where the speech in question
both proposes a commercial transaction and addresses social or political issues, it may
nevertheless still be treated as commercial speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68. It seems that the very language utilized in commercial-
speech cases does not necessarily fit the framework of trade-secret law. Unlike in
trademark law, for instance, a trade-secret misappropriator (1) does not generally
propose transactions with the secret other than trying to use it for self-gain (in which
case it often will not be disclosed to others) and (2) the "economic motivation" of the
misappropriator is often not for personal gain but rather to harm the trade-secret owner.
Cf Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 553 (5th Cir. 2001)
(discussing economic motivation in the traditional context as direct economic gain to the
speaker).
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entities (including nonprofit organizations) will be the beneficiaries of
any takedown provision.21° Although commercial speech can be difficult
to define,21" ' an argument can be made that trade-secret law, and in
particular the information that would be subject to the takedown,
implicates commercial speech rather than core First Amendment
speech.212 While commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection,"' it receives a lesser degree of protection than that afforded
to other kinds of speech, such as political speech.214 Therefore, any
assessment of First Amendment conflicts that arise when trade-secret
law restricts protected speech must launch from this platform of weaker
protection. In doing so, apples are compared to apples:2 5 the
permissibility of trade-secret restrictions are evaluated in light of the
restrictions in other areas of intellectual property. Moreover, given that
similar speech-restrictive regulations have passed constitutional muster
in other areas of intellectual property bodes well for this proposal.2 6
2. THE STATUTE ACTS AS A PUNISHMENT FOR LAWFULLY OBTAINED
TRUTHFUL INFORMATION ABOUT A MATTER OF PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE
The second set of potential First Amendment objections to the
statute will be derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Barticki
210. Recent data suggests that business entities comprise the majority of those
utilizing the DMCA takedown-notice provisions. Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at
649-50.
211. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REV. 627, 638-48 (1990); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical
Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 381-410 (1990).
212. Core First Amendment speech generally relates to political, artistic,
literary, historical, cultural, and social concerns. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208. Merely because speech concerns a commercial subject
does not necessarily make it commercial speech for First Amendment purposes. City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 420 (1993). However, the
speech must be evaluated as a whole, in context, and considering the discloser's
motives. See generally Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First
Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 988 (2007)
(discussing commercial and noncommercial speech in trademark law).
213. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-64 (1980).
214. See id. at 562-63; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24.
215. Some scholars may take issue with a direct comparison of trade-secret law
to copyright, patent, and trademark law given the debate about whether trade secrets
are property. However, for the reasons expressed in the next Section, they are close
enough to be considered apples (even if some are green and others are red).
216. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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v. Vopper.21 7 While Bartnicki was not a trade-secret case, the question
before the Court was whether under the First Amendment the media
could be liable for disclosing the contents of communications illegally
intercepted by wiretapping 218 A plurality of the Supreme Court
reasoned that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a
need ... of the highest order."2 19 The important considerations for
Bartnicki appeared to be that the media respondents did not play a part
in the illegal interception of the information, that they obtained the
tapes lawfully, and that the information221 was of public concern.
22 1
To the extent the proposed statute punishes the media for posting
lawfully obtained trade-secret information about matters of public
significance, it could run afoul of Bartnicki. It does not, however.
First, and most importantly, the carveout for established news
organizations would render this argument essentially moot. Indeed, the
takedown requests would not apply to information posted by exempted
media organizations (the very kind of media outlets directly covered by
Bartnick). Even under an extremely liberal interpretation of Barnicki,
which reaches persons not covered under the carveout, the "lawfully
obtained" and "public significance" factors are unlikely fatal to the
statute.
a. Unlawfully obtained
The trade secrets subject to takedown under the statute would
necessarily be unlawfully obtained; misappropriation of a trade secret
requires a wrongful acquisition of the secret.222 Mere acquisition of
another's trade secret (without use or disclosure) is actionable as long
as the person knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
wrongfully acquired.2 23 Bartnick is distinguishable because Vopper, the
radio commentator who obtained the tape, acquired the tape from
217. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
218. Id. at 525.
219. Id. at 528 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)).
220. The intercepted conversation included discussion of blowing up the front
porches of the homes of adversaries of the union. Id. at 518-19.
221. Id. at 525.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995)
("Protection is available only against a wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the
trade secret.").
223. See id. § 40 cmt. b (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
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someone else who claimed that it had been left anonymously in his
mailbox.2"4 Thus, Vopper did not obtain the tape illegally.225 A person
who acquires a trade secret under similar circumstances would,
however, unlawfully obtain it because the circumstances would suggest
that the person had reason to know that the trade secret was wrongfully
acquired. 26 Such acquisition in itself would constitute misappropriation.
Thus, consistent with trade-secret law, the intent of the takedown
statute would be to capture and require removal of precisely this kind of
unlawfully obtained information and could be squared with Barwicki.
b. Public significance
Keeping in mind the carveout for established news organizations,
the remainder of the information implicated under the statute would not
likely be information of public significance and not such that it would
be shielded under Barickl. In fact, the plurality in Bartnicki
specifically asserted that "[w]e need not decide whether [the interest in
preserving privacy] is strong enough to justify the application of
§ 2511(c) to disclosures of trade secrets . . . or other information of
purely private concern."227 This, at the very least, suggests that the
Court considers trade secrets not to be at the level of public significance
on which the Bartnicki decision turned. Two of the six justices (Justices
Stephen Breyer and Sandra Day O'Connor) made clear in their
concurrence that their vote relied on the fact that the speech involved
was of "unusual public concern, namely, a threat of potential physical
harm to others." 228 Even though trade secrets might involve issues of
public concern, it is very unlikely that a trade secret removed under the
statutory scheme proposed here would meet the "unusual public
concern" standard as articulated by Breyer and O'Connor.
Moreover, even if the removed trade-secret information were
newsworthy, it is unclear whether the disclosure would be permissible
under current trade-secret law.22 Under the proposed legislation,
224. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
225. The federal wiretap law at issue in the case made it illegal to
"intentionally disclose . . . to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication." 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
226. See discussion supra note 223.
227. Bartnick, 532 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J. concurring).
229. In general, the trade-secret cases where First Amendment defenses have
successfully shielded disclosures of allegedly newsworthy trade secrets have involved
defendants who are journalists or news organizations. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis,
1080
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however, newsworthy trade-secret information could be posted in
certain circumstances. For example, suppose the Wall Street Journal
broke a story on its Web site based on leaked trade-secret
information.23° The takedown would not apply. If, however, the
employee who obtained the trade-secret information posted it onto a
chat site instead of sending it to the newspaper, the employee may be
liable based for a breach of duty of confidence, regardless of the First
Amendment.231 Accordingly, the mere fact that the statute would cover
information that may be of public significance would not, without
more, offend the First Amendment. Indeed, the statute provides a built-
in alternative to the individual who wishes to disclose a genuinely
newsworthy trade secret of public significance: provide it to a news
organization rather than posting it directly and subjecting it to a
takedown request.
c. An observation on the public-versus-private-concern labels
The public-versus-private-concern distinction, though firmly
rooted in First Amendment jurisprudence, is not, however, blessed with
clarity or consistency.232 Indeed, the boundary is blurry between that
which is considered of "public concern"-and thus worthy of greater
First Amendment protection-and that which is of private concern.233
The highly subjective nature of the public-versus-private-concern
510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) (involving CBS television network); Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 221 (6th Cir. 1996) (involving Business Week
magazine); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(involving the Washington Post).
230. One recent example of a similar event occurred in the spring of 2007
when a former Wal-Mart employee was sued by the company for, among other things,
leaking trade secrets to the Wall Street Journal. Ann Zimmerman & Gary McWilliams,
Wal-Mart's Firing of a Security Aide Bites the Firm Back, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007,
at Al.
231. Cf Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(holding that the First Amendment protects a third party from liability for disclosing
trade-secret information because the third party was not under any duty not to disclose).
This case suggests that the outcome would be different if the person posting were
himself under a duty of confidence, such as an employee would be. Id.; Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980) (finding that a contract requiring a former
Central Intelligence Agency agent to submit his memoirs for prepublication review was
enforceable and not a prior restraint); Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 580-81
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment did not shield a congressman
under duty of confidentiality when he disclosed an unlawfully intercepted taped
conversation to the media).
232. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1990); Volokh, supra note 43, at 747.
233. See Volokh, supra note 43, at 747.
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analysis may provide at least a partial explanation for this
phenomenon.2 34 There is a further danger from the First Amendment
perspective in having courts decide what disclosures are newsworthy.
235
Yet, under trade-secret law courts routinely make similar discretionary
decisions as they ultimately decide whether a protectable trade secret
exists. Nevertheless, projecting that mold onto trade-secret law would
appear to lead to the inexorable conclusion in virtually every case that
the subject of the trade secret could be a matter of public concern. That
is because, by definition, trade secrets would be valuable to competitors
and, not surprisingly, of interest to them.
Accordingly, it would follow that if the formula to Coca-Cola
(hailed as the quintessential trade secret)236 were stolen and disclosed on
the Internet, it would be considered of public concern because such a
disclosure would be met with great interest from beverage competitors
and consumers. This analysis is misplaced and ill-suited for trade-secret
law, which even the Baricki court recognized.237 It would swallow the
protections granted under trade-secret law and concomitantly have the
effect of creating a categorical rule that the First Amendment always
trumps trade-secret law.
Trade-secret law recognizes limited circumstances in which an
individual will be privileged to divulge trade-secret information because
such information is in the public interest.23s Using those exceptions as a
guide, it would seem wise to modify the discourse by introducing more
relevant and less ambiguous categorization. Namely, those trade secrets
of "substantial public concern" will be privileged, as they arguably
already are. But the vast remainder would concern private-business
matters and either fall outside the purview of or be subject to a lower
234. See id. at 747-48 (criticizing courts' public concern analyses and
conclusions).
235. See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 114 (Ct. App. 2006)
(noting the concern in having courts decide what technological disclosures are
newsworthy).
236. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,
289 (D. Del. 1985) ("The complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade
secrets in the world.").
237. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (suggesting that trade
secrets are matters of purely private concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that a report about a company's
bankruptcy is not a matter of public concern); DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 16 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the posting of source code is not
substantially related to a legitimate matter of public concern).
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995).
Some whistleblowing statutes also privilege disclosures of trade secrets. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 2007); N.Y. Lab. Law § 740 (McKinney 2002 & Supp.
2007).
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level of scrutiny under the First Amendment.2 39 If the secret Coca-Cola
formula contained a poisonous substance that company officials had
been aware was causing cancer, then the person who posted that
revelation on the Internet would have a stronger First Amendment
defense than if the disclosure were merely to reveal nonharmful
ingredients.240
Consider again the hypothetical involving Dave and the Microsoft
source code. Dave is not likely to prevail on his First Amendment
challenge for a host of reasons. First, Dave disclosed the trade secret in
breach of his agreement with Microsoft, and a court is likely to find
that the First Amendment will not sanction his conduct.241 Second, to
the extent Dave claims to have been merely expressing his dislike of
Microsoft, Dave was not acting as a journalist but as a salesperson.242
Third, if Dave or the Web-site operator were to attempt an argument
under Bartnicki (even though the kind of media organization present in
Bartnicki is absent here) it would likely fail 24 3 because the source code
was unlawfully obtained-Dave knew that it was a Microsoft trade
secret and that he was disclosing it in breach of his agreement with the
company24-and because the source code does not implicate the kind of
"unusual public concern" contemplated in Bartnicki.245
d. Trade secrets as quasi-property
Another factor that often touches on the debate about the role of
the First Amendment in trade-secret law is the significance of viewing
trade-secret protection as a property right. Courts tend to lend greater
weight to interests that can be characterized as property rights when
239. This kind of test would, at least to some degree, include consideration of
the discloser's motives for posting the information. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 15-16
(characterizing trade secrets that convey technical information as matters of private
concern); Estlund, supra note 232, at 37 (suggesting that Supreme Court cases
"strongly suggest that expression arising out of and motivated by a workplace dispute
or other controversy in which the speaker has a personal stake is presumptively not of
legitimate concern to the public").
240. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (allowing postings of internal company e-mails regarding problems
with voting machines under the fair-use rubric); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-62
(holding that distributing a credit report from a business declaring bankruptcy was not
of public concern); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding that a
questionnaire concerning staff morale in a district attorney's office in the context of an
employee's personal dissatisfaction with the office was not of public concern).
241. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part VI.A. 1.a.
243. See supra Part VI.A.2.
244. See supra Part VI.A.2.a.
245. See supra Part VI.A.2.b.
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balancing against First Amendment concerns.246 The question of
whether trade-secret law confers a "property" right or merely protects
against breaches of confidence has been subject to debate and supported
by arguments on both sides.247 However, analysis of contemporary
trade-secret law may better recognize a hybrid-like nature of trade-
secret law that is grounded in theories of both property and confidence,
rather than in a mutually exclusive struggle.248
Thus, there is ample support for the position that despite the lack
of exclusive rights to a trade-secret owner, trade-secret law confers
sufficient property-like rights to at least require a thoughtful analysis
under the First Amendment (rather than a categorical trumping by the
First Amendment) and to grant it the same kind of deference as its
intellectual property siblings. 49 This is not to suggest that treating trade
secrets as property makes them immune to First Amendment concerns
but rather that a lower level of scrutiny might be appropriate.
246. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal.
2003) ("[P]rohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets acquired by improper means is the
only way to preserve the property interest created by trade secret law and its
concomitant ability to encourage invention.").
247. For those cases espousing a property view, see, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404
(9th Cir. 1982); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868); Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v.
Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). For cases
espousing a breach of confidence view, see, E./ du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110,
115-16 (1892); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
248. While it is true that trade-secret law protects against breaches of
confidence, in order to succeed on a misappropriation claim, a trade-secret owner must
prove that the information rises to protectable status as a trade secret. The breach alone,
without the property-like protectable status, is insufficient. See Lariscey v. United
States, 949 F.2d 1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The laws governing ownership and use
of unpatented property and unpublished information thus derive from theories of
property, adapted to achieve fairness in commercial relationships . . . .") (internal
citations omitted). For discussions on treating protection of information as property, see
generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Tracdtional Definition of
Property?." A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REv. 603, 624 (1994).
249. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04 (exposing a secret formula
could be an unconstitutional taking); Chicago Lock Co., 676 F.2d at 404; E.I. du Pont
de Nemours, 288 F.2d at 912 (sale of secret process invoked capital-gains tax); Bunner,
75 P.3d at 13 (endorsing the property-rights view of trade-secret law); Teller v. Teller,
53 P.3d 240, 247-49 (Haw. 2002) (trade secrets are property for division in marital
estate); Peabody, 98 Mass. at 458; Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 566 A.2d at 1228.
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B. Trade-Secret-Identification Issues
Unlike the other branches of intellectual property, an owner cannot
register a trade secret and be granted a certificate or other proof of
ownership.25° Indeed, federal statutory law does not even govern trade-
secret law; state law governs it. 25' An entity that has taken reasonable
steps to protect valuable business information only knows with certainty
whether a court will agree that the information is indeed a trade secret
when the court actually makes the determination. With that in mind,
permitting removal of materials that a trade-secret owner claims as
trade secret before a court has had any opportunity to conduct a review
can be problematic and subject to abuse.
This is not entirely unlike copyright law, however, which is itself
highly nuanced, fact specific, and subject to the infamously uncertain
fair-use defense. As a result, like § 512 notices, the trade-secret-
takedown notices may be questionable. Even without bad faith, a notice
may be deficient because of the legal difficulty in certifying a trade
secret.252 Accordingly, safeguards such as the bond/fee requirement, the
required initiation of a misappropriation action, and the remedy for
bad-faith takedown requests should be inserted at different stages of the
takedown process help to address this concern.
C. Technological Puzzles
Even with the best-laid legislation, technological advancement will
continue to pose difficulties for trade-secret owners seeking to enforce
their rights over the Internet. This is part of a larger problem where
emerging technologies test the existing legal paradigms and create the
ever-changing potential for users, with either good or bad intentions, to
thwart the law.253
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995) ("It is
not possible to state precise criteria for determining the existence of a trade secret. The
status of information claimed as a trade secret must be ascertained through a
comparative evaluation of all the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and
definiteness of the information as well as the nature of the defendant's misconduct.");
See MELVIN F. JAGER, 1 TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:1 (2007).
251. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), which lends some uniformity in defining trade secrets
and misappropriation. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformactfactsheets/
uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
252. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 681 (discussing failure of some
notice senders to understand the parameters of copyright law).
253. See generally Tomas A. Lipinski, The Developing Legal Infrastructure
and the Globalization of Information: Constructing a Framework for Critical Choices in
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Moreover, it would be remiss to overlook the cultural backlash
that a trade-secret-takedown mechanism may engender, both generally
and in specific cases. Indeed, there is always the risk that attempts to
take down posted information may result in even more rapid spreading
of the information. 54 At the very least, like the DMCA, Web sites or
projects dedicated to collecting trade-secret owners' takedown notices
are certain to emerge, giving even greater exposure to the alleged
secrets. 255
One approach would be to let the courts deal with these issues as
they arise. Indeed, some commentators suggest that legislation
constrains the courts who are better equipped to develop doctrine in a
manner that is "fluid and responsive to changes in technology."
256
However, courts may often defer to policymakers to legislate these new
challenges and simply find that certain technological advances are not
contemplated in existing legislation. 257 As one court lamented:
It is not the province of the courts . . . to rewrite the DMCA
in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen internet
architecture, no matter how damaging that development has
been .... The plight of copyright holders must be addressed
in the first instance by the Congress ... 258
In the end, there is no uncomplicated answer, and the solution probably
lies in a multifaceted approach with built-in flexibility.
Even with legislation, it will continue to be possible for creative
and motivated individuals to evade compliance. For example, a
practical problem and potential loophole that may continue to plague
the New Millennium Internet-Character, Content and Confusion, 6 RICH. J.L. &
TECH., 19, 22, 30 (Winter 1999-2000), http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/
v6i4article2.htm (discussing how copyright law and trademark law have had to adapt to
new technologies); Richard H. Chused, Rewrite Copyright.- Protecting Creativity and
Social Utility in the Digital Age, ISRAEL L. REv., Fall 2005, at 80, 83 (discussing
responses to new technological developments).
254. SeeDVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 190
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing campaign to spread alleged trade-secret material in
retaliation against plaintiff's lawsuit); Cundiff, supra note 2, at 410-11 (noting that
filing a suit can lead to a "chatting frenzy on the Internet").
255. Cf supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the Chilling Effects
Project).
256. Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service
Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 38
IDEA 335, 354 (1998).
257. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005);
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
258. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d at 1238.
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trade-secret owners is the ease with which alleged misappropriators can
simply move the material to a different site after being subject to a
takedown.259 In other instances, they may also repost the information on
the same site by altering their identities. 6 ° Moreover, even without
human manipulation, a cached version of the information may remain
on the search engine or on the hard drive of anyone who has viewed the
information. 26 Once a search engine picks the information, it may also
store the information on its own server, which makes it possible for
multiple servers to store the material.262 Finally, the information may
also remain in archival form on the Internet.263
One glaring hole in enforcement of the DMCA has been peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing, and it is worth considering how any trade-
secret legislation should address this technological architecture (and
others like it that are yet unanticipated). P2P-file-sharing services
involve circumstances where users store files on their computers and
send them directly to each other rather than having the material reside
on a central server. Instead, the users' ISPs simply act as a conduit in
the process. This kind of distribution system makes it difficult to
identify the specific source of infringing material and to identify
infringers.264 Until the law in this area settles, proactive preemptive
measures may be the best recourse for trade-secret owners.265
It is important to recognize that legislation alone may not be the
best approach to this kind of problem, which in many ways seems ill-
suited to the fluid and individualized nature of trade-secret law.
259. See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000,
1002 (9th Cir. 2004) ("After receiving notice from his ISP that his website would be
shut down, Rossi found a new ISP to host [the material]."); Urban & Quilter, supra
note 8, at 679-80.
260. See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1097 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (discussing vendor whose account was terminated after a
takedown notice but then who opened at least two different vendor accounts under
slightly different names).
261. Cundiff, supra note 2, at 405.
262. See generally Matthew Fagan, Note, Can You Do a Wayback on That?
The Legal Community's Use of Cached Web Pages in and out of Trial, 13 B.U.J. Sci.
& TECH. L. 46, 50-55 (2007).
263. See, e.g., Internet Archive: Wayback Machine, http://www.archive.org/
web/web.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
264. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet
Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 17
(2006).
265. See, e.g., Larry Greenemeier, Beware P2P Networks With a Tunnel To
Confidential Data, Study Warns, INFO. WK., Mar. 15, 2007, http://
www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID = 199600527 (discussing
blocking company ports to prevent access to P2P networks and tracking potentially
leaked data).
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Ironically, in time, trade-secret owners may discover that technology
proves the most successful way to combat other technology.266 Imagine,
for instance, a brave new world where Web crawlers search the
Internet continuously for specially tagged trade-secret information and
prevent its transmission or posting on any unauthorized site.267 Until
then, however, it would be imprudent for trade-secret owners to ignore
the fact that the best defense is a good offense; vigilance in protecting268
and monitoring trade secrets before they are posted on the Internet is
critical. To that end, an assortment of technological tools is available to
monitor employees and maintain better control of trade-secret
information.269
D. International Materials
Some of the material targeted by a takedown notice may very well
reside outside of the United States. 27 ° While foreign-owned material
hosted on a U.S. server may be subject to U.S. laws, it is unclear
whether material hosted outside the United States could be covered.
The extent to which trade-secret misappropriation that occurs outside
the United States may be redressed in U.S. courts is, to some degree,
unsettled. 27 1 This could create practical and legal difficulties for a trade-
266. For instance, movie studios, frustrated by hackers discovering and posting
passwords on the Internet to enable copying of DVDs, have a new strategy. If hackers
post stolen passwords on the Web, the studios can change the passwords, disabling the
ability to play the DVD unless the consumer downloads updated software with the new
password. Keith Winstein, Consumers May Get Caught in Piracy War-Strategy To
Thwart Movie Copying Could Frustrate Innocent Users, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at
B3.
267. Realization of such a scenario may be closer than one would think. See,
e.g., Kevin J. Delaney, Brooks Barnes & Matthew Karnitschnig, Policing Web Video
with 'Fingerprints,' WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at B1 (reporting on policing web
video with fingerprints to detect copyright infringement).
268. See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts v. Consorcio Barr, 267 F.
Supp. 2d 1268, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing steps to protect plaintiffs computer
network); Wrap-N-Pack, Inc. v. Eisenberg, No. 04-cv-4887 (DRH)(JO), 2007 WL
952069, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) (illustrating plaintiff's "significant
safeguards" to protect its customer information).
269. For discussion of various technologies that are currently available, see
Meir S. Hornung, Think Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the Workplace,
11 FORDHAM J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 115, 125-26 (2005); Cundiff, supra note 2, at 413-18;
Daniel W. Park, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment, and Patent Law: A Collision on
the Information Superhighway, STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN., Autumn 2004, at 46, 60.
270. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 8, at 676 (reporting on the large number
of § 512 notices that targeted material outside the United States).
271. Compare Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Huawei Techs. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551,
555 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (applying Texas trade-secret law in granting a worldwide
preliminary injunction on a misappropriation claim but noting that Chinese trade-secret
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secret owner, even with a takedown provision, since alleged infringers
may simply move the information to a foreign server.
One answer involving possible criminal sanctions may lie with the
Economic Espionage Act, which has a very broad territorial reach. This
act covers conduct that occurs outside the United States as long as an
"act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States."272 Furthermore, if the defendant is a U.S. corporation, citizen,
or permanent resident, even acts of misappropriation that occur entirely
on foreign soil violate the statute.273 It might be advisable in this context
to consider similar terms for trade-secret-takedown legislation that
would operate independently or in conjunction with the Economic
Espionage Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
For trade-secret owners, the goal ought to be keeping trade secrets
from leaking onto the Internet in the first instance. When a trade secret
is revealed on the Internet despite the owner's best efforts, however, as
presented in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, any
chance of saving the trade secret from destruction lies in the trade-
secret owner's acting with utmost urgency to prevent further
dissemination of the secret. Currently, the only available judicial
instrument to effectuate removal of a trade secret posted on the Internet
is injunctive relief. The speed with which information can be circulated
over the Internet, coupled with the time and expense involved in
seeking injunctive relief, suggests that a more expedient and efficient
mechanism is necessary to fill the gap until a court can intervene.
This Article has explored the possibility of legislation, using the
safe-harbor provision of the DMCA as a starting point, that would offer
a shield to trade-secret owners to protect their intellectual property
while also providing a safe harbor to ISPs from trade-secret-
misappropriation claims. From a trade-secret owner's perspective, the
ability to have trade-secret information removed from a Web site via a
takedown provision is undoubtedly valuable. Accordingly, given the
importance of trade secrets to American businesses, Congress should
enact takedown legislation for trade secrets.
law may have been applicable), with BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre
Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 2000) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction on
a trade-secret-misappropriation claim and finding that Taiwan, not the United States,
would have a greater interest "in setting the standards that govern the conduct of its
own citizens regarding intellectual property that is present within its borders.")
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1837(2) (2000).
273. Id. § 1837(1).
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